For two decades, the love affair between Georgia and the West had been a passionate one.
Here in the forbidding geography of the Caucasus — surrounded by Russia, Turkey and Iran — is a small, plucky country that saw itself as part of the West. European Union flags flew in front of all government buildings even when membership in the bloc seemed no more than a fantasy. Georgians, when they find out you are American, nearly always express their love of the United States and their gratitude for American support against their centuries-long enemy, Russia.
For years, that affection was warmly reciprocated in Washington, Brussels and other European capitals, where Georgia has long been a cherished partner — an inspiring example of the spread of Western values and a key strategic outpost for projecting influence deep into the post-Soviet space.
But these days, the romance is on the rocks. The ruling Georgian Dream party has become openly hostile to its Western partners. They in turn have hit back, going so far as to sanction senior Georgian officials. The tension is now reaching a peak as Georgians prepare to vote in parliamentary elections on Saturday. The United States and the European Union are opposing Georgian Dream as openly as they can, while maintaining the thinnest veneer of impartiality.
Polls here are unreliable and it is anyone’s guess who will win. Yet even if the ruling party loses, the factors that have driven the country’s turn against the West are not going away. Like going bankrupt, the collapse in relations between Georgia and the West happened gradually, then suddenly. And there’s no assurance they can be restored.
The immediate cause of the current crisis was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Georgian Dream took a highly cautious stance, refusing to take sides. Georgia already lost a war to Russia in 2008, and the launch of one in Ukraine rekindled fears that it could happen again.
Western policymakers were initially understanding of Georgia’s neutrality. They appreciated the country’s precarious position: After all, Georgia had no security guarantee from the West, despite years of unsuccessful efforts to gain NATO membership. Even as it tried to stay neutral in the Ukraine war, Georgia applied for — and last year received — candidate status in the European Union.
But things quickly degenerated. Georgian Dream, which has been moving to the right, began promoting an elaborate conspiracy theory in which a “global war party” was pushing Georgia to enter the war against Russia on behalf of the West and Ukraine. It also claimed that the domestic opposition was in cahoots with this force.
The party attacked media and nongovernmental organizations that got funding from abroad, claiming they were following Western orders to put the opposition in power. This year it passed a law — over huge protests — that would designate those groups as foreign agents. The law evoked ominous comparisons with Russia, which has used a similar designation to suffocate critical voices there.
The United States and the European Union responded forcefully. Over the past few months Washington has slapped financial sanctions and visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials and canceled joint military exercises. Brussels, for its part, has suspended accession talks. Relations are at an all-time low.
This comes as the war in Ukraine has given the Caucasus region a new strategic significance. Europe is trying to develop new transportation routes to Asia that bypass Russia: If you want to avoid Iran as well, the Caucasus is the only way to go. In an effort to break its dependence on Russian energy, the European Union is increasing its purchases of Azerbaijani gas, which moves through Georgia on its way to Europe, and financing a massive new electric cable from Georgia to Romania under the Black Sea.
Just as Europe needs Georgia more, Georgia seems to need the West less. The government recently awarded a contract to build a critical port on the Black Sea to a Chinese-led consortium, as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Western officials publicly objected to awarding such a strategic project to China, but in private, diplomats acknowledge that no Western business was willing to put up the required funds.
Eight years since Georgia signed a trade agreement with the European Union, trade with Europe — to say nothing of trade with the United States — remains relatively limited and Georgia’s commerce is dominated by countries closer to its borders. Like many countries in the region, Georgia has profited economically from Russia’s isolation from Western markets, reshipping cars to Russia and hosting new businesses run by Russian émigrés.
These developments appear to have made Georgian Dream believe that instead of remaining unswervingly loyal to the West, it can be more transactional — and that Georgia’s geostrategic importance may be enough for Washington and Brussels to overlook both its growing disobedience and its rapid lurch toward autocracy. The party may be overestimating just how much clout it has. But it’s undeniable that the country has more options than ever.
The opposition offers no simple remedy. Many Georgians have idealized notions and outsize expectations of the West that seem to date to the unipolar era of the 1990s and 2000s rather than the more anarchic 2024. It often feels as if pro-Western Georgians are outsourcing their political power to Europe and America rather than trying to make changes themselves. An opposition victory may offer a short-term way out of the crisis. But economic and geopolitical realities point to the country’s relationship with the West inevitably growing more distant.
All this puts Georgia in a very uncertain position ahead of the election. The prospects for unrest are not small: Georgian Dream may try to steal the election, and it’s hard to imagine the opposition accepting defeat. The United States and the European Union will be expected to try to mediate. But it’s not clear whether, in the long run, they can keep Georgia from slipping out of their embrace.
The post This Country Turned Against the West, and It’s Not Coming Back appeared first on New York Times.
