The Middle East teeters on the brink of a regional war, and Israel’s conflict with Hamas hit the one-year mark on Oct 7. The longer that such wars—particularly when they are centered around long-standing geopolitical hot spots—go on, the greater their potential to spread—not just militarily, but also into the tangled domains of hybrid warfare, where political, strategic, and economic demands meet. Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a telling set of examples of what might be to come in the Middle East.
While the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought global attention to the conflict, the war was already long underway. Its start came with the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014 and Russia’s subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which was followed by Russian support of pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine during the ensuing years. Attempts at international mediation and negotiations over a cease-fire ultimately proved unsuccessful, leading to a gradual escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine that exploded into full-scale war nearly a decade later.
The Middle East teeters on the brink of a regional war, and Israel’s conflict with Hamas hit the one-year mark on Oct 7. The longer that such wars—particularly when they are centered around long-standing geopolitical hot spots—go on, the greater their potential to spread—not just militarily, but also into the tangled domains of hybrid warfare, where political, strategic, and economic demands meet. Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a telling set of examples of what might be to come in the Middle East.
While the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought global attention to the conflict, the war was already long underway. Its start came with the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv in 2014 and Russia’s subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, which was followed by Russian support of pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine during the ensuing years. Attempts at international mediation and negotiations over a cease-fire ultimately proved unsuccessful, leading to a gradual escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine that exploded into full-scale war nearly a decade later.
The hybrid dimension of the conflict has emerged as a pivotal component of the war. This spans everything from sanctions to cyberattacks to proxy conflicts between Moscow and Kyiv that go far beyond the front lines in Eastern Europe. And it’s played nearly as critical a role as the battlefield in shaping the course of the war.
Sanctions and other forms of economic restrictions have been some of the most actively used tools by Western states to pressure and weaken Moscow without having to get militarily involved in the conflict directly. The United States and European Union have levied thousands of sanctions against Russia, including against individuals, companies, and entire sectors such as banking and energy. For Washington, this has also included the use of secondary sanctions, which are designed to punish or dissuade non-Russian countries or companies from engaging with those sanctioned entities.
These strategies have been applied to various countries—from China to India to the United Arab Emirates—and reshaped global trade and financial flows while also spurring such countries to seek out loopholes and workarounds in order to mitigate their economic impact.
One case in point is the Central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan. One of the country’s largest banks—MBank, owned by former Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov—is reported by the Kyiv Independent to be working with Russia’s Sberbank, which has been sanctioned by the EU and United States. One of the mechanisms allegedly used by MBank to bypass sanctions involves a partnership with Bank 131, a Sberbank subsidiary that facilitates international payments.
Through a Singapore-based financial technology company called Thunes, MBank has reportedly reestablished payment channels linked to Sberbank, allowing it to conduct transactions in clear violation of the sanctions. Babanov himself is reportedly facing potential sanctions due to allegations that his company, Asia Cement, is linked to Russia’s nuclear industry.
MBank is not alone in this scrutiny. Other major Kyrgyz banks, including RSK and Keremet, are also under the spotlight for potentially bypassing anti-Kremlin sanctions. Both institutions rely on services from the KartStandard processing center and a local affiliate, CSI, which are effectively subsidiaries of Russia’s CFT Group, a company sanctioned by the United States in August.
If MBank and other Kyrgyz businesses continue their apparent engagement with sanctioned Russian companies, they may face secondary sanctions from Washington and the EU, which could in turn lead to Kyrgyzstan’s financial isolation, loss of access to international markets, and diminished foreign investment. Sanctions have been a potent tool for the West—and one that can affect countries far beyond the front lines.
Another key area is the cybersphere. Cyberattacks are, of course, not a new phenomenon, but they have been increasingly used by Kyiv and Moscow against a growing list of targets, including military sites, government agencies, and critical infrastructure such as energy grids and power plants. Russia has also employed cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns against Ukraine’s Western backers, most notably during its efforts to interfere with U.S. elections in 2016, and has shown no signs of abating such practices in the current election cycle.
A third arena in the hybrid sphere of the Russia-Ukraine war has taken the form of proxy conflicts, with the Middle East and Africa serving as key theaters. In the case of the Middle East, Russia has ramped up its support for anti-Western regimes since 2014, from intervening in the Syrian civil war in support of Bashar al-Assad in 2015 to beefing up cooperation with Iran.
Escalating tensions in the Middle East more recently have not deterred Moscow from providing such support, with Russia increasing economic and security ties with Iran, while the two countries reportedly plan to sign a strategic partnership agreement at the upcoming summit of the BRICS bloc (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and several recently added members) in late October.
In Africa, the Russia-Ukraine proxy war has taken on a more direct dimension, particularly in the Sahel region. Russia and Ukraine back rival sides of the Sudan conflict, with Russian Wagner Group mercenaries supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces while Kyiv backs the Sudanese Armed Forces. Ukrainian special forces have reportedly participated in drone strikes against Wagner forces in Sudan, and Ukraine also was accused of providing intelligence to rebels in Mali for an attack on Wagner forces operating there. Such a move prompted Mali and Niger to cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine, while Moscow accused Kyiv of opening a “second front” in their war.
The multidimensional nature of the war has complicated efforts to resolve the it diplomatically, given the sheer number of players pulled into the conflict and their complicated web of competing interests.
The Middle East could see similar hybrid dynamics emerge or strengthen in parallel to the military component of the conflict. This could include everything from the economic spread of anti-Israel boycotts to the politicization of the conflict in countries throughout the Muslim world to the growing use of cyberwarfare both within the region and outside of it.
After all, the war in Ukraine has shown no bounds when it comes to hybrid implications, with various aspects of connectivity between those involved—from energy to grain to telecommunications—being weaponized in the conflict.
This should serve as a cautionary tale for the Middle East. The longer that conflict drags on, the more players that it is likely to pull in (whether directly or indirectly) and the greater the consequences will be. Without a concerted effort to resolve or at least mitigate the conflict diplomatically, the hybrid components of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could be a sign for what’s to come in the Middle East—and far beyond.
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